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MODEL STATUTE: INTERNATIONAL

DRAINAGE BASIN POLLUTION CONTROL
ROBERT ISRAEL AND ROBERT ZUPKUS*

This article reviews briefly the attempts which have
been made to control pollution of international rivers
and then posits an ideal commission designed to
remedy the weaknesses of previous commissions. ED.
There can no longer be any doubt that environmental
pollution presents a serious threat to the well-being of mankind. Because of rapid and widespread dispersal of pollutants
the problem is shared by all nations, and now endangers people
everywhere. This is particularly true of marine pollution. The
sea is the common heritage of all. Regardless of distance from
the ocean, all people must ultimately depend upon it as a
source of food and natural resources, and as the key factor
in the natural process of recycling earthly wastes. Just as
universally, the nations of the world have been contributing
to the upset of this balance. Deterioration of the sea is the
by-product of a number of human enterprises. No single
source of pollution, however, is of greater consequence than
river discharge.
Rivers carry a variety of man made pollutants to the sea,
the most harmful of which are municipal, industrial, agricultural, and mining wastes. Although the technology is presently
available to curtail much of this river pollution, its implementation has been remarkably retarded.1 Improper river
management thus is mostly to blame for the serious deterioration of the oceans. 2 The proper establishment of river management schemes poses no insurmountable obstacle to the
goal of pollution abatement. Just as the scientific expertise
is available to reduce river pollution, the theoretical and adauthors are senior students at the University of Denver College
of Law. Mr. Zupkus received an AB Degree from the University of
Illinois in 1969, and Mr. Israel received an AB Degree from Franklin
and Marshall College in 1969.
** Letters within parentheses refer to the Comments.
1 Addendum, Report of the Secretary-General, River Discharge and
Marine Pollution, E/C.7/2 Add. 8 (1971).
*The
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ministrative base now exists to implement sound river control.
Unfortunately, international rivers have never been a source
of enduring international accord. Traditionally, the sphere
has been governed by political and economic expediency
rather than by common sense. This is particularly true in the
case of international rivers where the usual political and
economic complications are intensified.
To be sure, the international community has attempted
to deal with the pollution of its rivers. A number of treaties
have been devised in an effort to end international river pollution. As early as 1909, the United States and Canada entered
into a treaty which contained provisions to decrease the pollution of their common waters. 3 Germany made treaties with
Denmark in 1922 and Belgium in 1929 which expressly outlawed contamination of international waters. 4 Furthermore,
the most recent theories of international river management
have evolved into philosophies which are committed to the
elimination of water pollution.
Two of these doctrines are known as territorial integrity
and equitable apportionment. They developed from the
medieval notion of territorial sovereignty, one implication of
which was that a country deal freely with the waters which
flowed across its boundaries. Succinctly stated, territorial integrity encompasses both the negative principle of "not causing injury by artifically altering the natural conditions of the
[river's] flow" and the positive principle that the "most
practical and beneficial uses for the lower and upper riparians
. . . [are] to be taken into consideration." 5 Under this doctrine, prior mutual consent of all affected riparians who might
be affected is required before the basic character of the water
may be altered by any fellow riparian.
A more recent philosophy, equitable apportionment, is
grounded in natural law.6 Its basic premise is that the "water
source of a river is the common and inalienable property of
all countries watered by it." 7 Technical methods and benefits
surrounding international river use should transcend traditional political boundaries and be shared by all riparians on
3

Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 842-43
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Lester]; Erichsen-Brown, Legal Implication

of Boundary Water Pollution, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 65 (1968)
after cited as Erichsen-Brown].
4 Lester at 841.
5 F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1959).
6 Id. at 22, 24.
7 Id. at 24.
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a reasonable basis.8 Unfortunately, the effect that these doctrines or the various treaties on the subject have had upon
pollution control is minimal.
The greatest shortcoming of both territorial integrity and
most anti-pollution treaties is that they tend to deal with pollution on a fragmented basis. Territorial integrity is limited
in that it rests on the presumption that an international river
is a divisible objectY While riparians must respect the rights
of co-riparians, they are still free to use a river as they wish
and reap the benefits on an individual basis. This arrangement
discourages cooperation among nations for large scale projects
such as resource management and pollution control. Further,
fractionated river use reduces pollution control to a cloak
and dagger affair. It becomes a game of detecting and proving violations of riparian rights. These same limitations apply
to treaties concerning pollution control. Too often such treaties are between only a few nations along a particular international water way. Consequently, river management and
pollution control for an entire river system is thwarted and
the program becomes inefficient and ineffective. The problem
is further complicated by enforcement procedures.
Whether operating under treaty or merely the general
philosophy of territorial integrity, both the violator and the
violated can easily abuse a pollution control program. The
Lake Lanoux incident between France and Spain demonstrates
some of the shortcomings of both treaty and territorial integrity. France had plans to temporarily divert large quantities of water from Lake Lanoux, the waters of which eventually flow into Spain. Although neither the character nor
the total flow of the water entering Spain would have been
altered, Spain invoked the doctrine of territorial integrity and
held up the project for forty years. The sole cause of the
hold-up appears to have been Spain's national vanity and
her desire to assert authority in international affairs.' 0 A
similarly unfortunate result would have been reached even if
Spain had asserted her rights under a formal treaty guaranteeing a continued and clean flow of water.
8

Van Aistyne, The Justiciability of International River Disputes: A
Study in the Case Method, 48 DuKE L. REv. 337 (1964) [hereinafter cited

as Van Alstyne].

9 Shapiro-Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation
of Riparian Competition, 45 INDIANA L. J. 28 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Shapiro-Libail.

1

oVan Alstyne at 314; Goldie, International Law and the Development of
International River Basins 4 U. BmT. COLUMB. L. REv. 772 (1963);

Shapiro-Libai at 31-2.
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Environmental relief is handicapped by further limitations inherent in territorial integrity and treaty agreements.
The individualistic nature of both these methods presupposes
a state versus state contest. As a result, only those interests
which a government is willing to defend will be protected.
Only a state may champion the cause of an injured citizen.
Should political considerations prevent a government from
pursuing an action in an international matter, then private
citizens or corporations would have no legal recourse." With
the multitude of other international pressures upon a nation
besides pollution abatement, many major environmental problems will not be adequately voiced.
Should an environmental matter reach an international
forum, there are still other problems which would preclude
effective pollution control on international rivers. Treaties
and territorial integrity by their very nature need judicial
decisions and arbitrational awards to give them effect. This
situation is unfortunate because such a process lacks the flexibility which is necessary for the adequate regulation of international rivers. 1 2 The unorganized rulings originating from
these tribunals cannot be forged into a unified and workable
program which could respond to the complexities of international river use. The inherent delay associated with the
judicial process is little inducement to entrust it with the
management of the complex and rapidly shifting situations
which comprise international river use.13 Additionally, while
international tribunals may be able to apply a uniform water
pollution program and attach proper liabilities, there exists
14
little authority to compel payment of compensatory damages.
Of all the possibilities currently existing to control pollution, the doctrine of equitable apportionment possesses the
greatest potential for effective river management. Besides requiring the sharing of all river benefits by all riparians, the doctrine treats an entire river basin as a single unit. As a result,
many more nations take part in the management of a particular river system and cooperation is on a broader basis and
goes deeper than usual under the doctrine of territorial integrity or under bilateral treaties. Enforcement of a program
is necessarily less disruptive because cooperation is rewarded
by the sharing of benefits. Nonetheless, the doctrine is still
11 Erichsen-Brown at 69.
12

Lester at 848.

13 Shapiro-Libai at 214.
14 Id.; Lester at 848; Erichsen-Brown at 68.
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too imperfect to be the best method for pollution control on
international rivers.
Several international bodies do engage in river management based upon equitable apportionment. These operate with
some measure of success, but none have managed to perform
their work without either high social costs or an extremely
favorable political and economic climate. The favorable conditions needed to establish a successful international river
management agency rarely occur in nature. Without a cooperative atmosphere, such undertakings cannot achieve the
efficiency and effectiveness necessary to adequately control
river use. 15 This is especially true for water pollution control
because of its costs and technical requirements. An examination of existing river management schemes illustrates these
problems.
One of the most successful programs is on the Columbia
River. Canada and the United States designed an agreement
for the exploitation of the river's electricity generating potential. Although the resources were equitably apportioned, the
work completed under the treaty resulted in a loss of between
$250 million and $375 million.1" The United States, for a variety
of political reasons, absorbed the entire loss. This generous
gesture, however, will not often be repeated, even for pollution control. Few international rivers have riparians inclined
to make large expenditures solely in the name of their fellow
man. Furthermore, commitments of this nature are notoriously
inflexible.l' Their continued success depends upon the perpetuation of the diplomatic climate in which they were made.
Without a broader base of interests, such river arrangements
will collapse with the slightest shift of the diplomatic winds.
The most famous scheme of river management and pollution control is Germany's Genossenschaften. Membership in
the Genossenschaften is mandatory for all river users. Over
the years sophisticated procedures have evolved for assessing
the cost of river use to its users. The effect has been the
apportionment of the Rhine system to meet a variety of
human needs while at the same time reducing water pollution
to a relatively small cost.' 8 The recommendation has been
15 Kenworthy, Joint Development of International Waters, 54 Am. J. INT'L
L. 602 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Kenworthy].
16 J. KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA WATER TREATY 195 (1967).
17 Id. at 202.
18 A. KNESSE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 238-40, 287 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KNESSE &
BowER].
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made that the idea be expanded to include international boundaries in the regulation of the Rhine system. Indeed, all nations along the Rhine have pledged their cooperation in ending
pollution of the river. They have further pledged one percent
of their gross national product to finance the operation. There
are, however, several flaws in this scheme.
In the first place, the Genossenschaften has not done as
much as is possible to end river and marine pollution. The
plan operates in the Ruhr district, one of the most industrialized areas of the world. Water quality there had actually
become so critical that it became a matter of survival. Effort
had to be expended to at least prevent further pollution. Yet,
since the members of the Genossenschaften are not only the
water users but also the water pollutors, their primary aim
is to achieve human survival at the lowest cost and not necessarily to purify the Rhine. As a result, the Genossenschaften
has not required uniform purity of the various rivers in the
Rhine basin. Some rivers are kept clean for drinking and
recreation. Other rivers are little more than open sewers.19
Both types of water find their way to the sea.
The other main problem with Genossenschaften is in the
manner in which it assesses costs. Regardless of the terminology used, the program essentially levies a use tax on the
industrialist, with the heavy pollutor bearing the brunt of the
tax. This restricts his operations without regard for the societal need for his product and even if his consumers are willing to pay more for the product.20 At the same time, this tax
eventually leads to a misallocation of resources. Bearing lower
taxes, less essential goods will carry a lower price and will
be purchased more frequently than their usefulness would
dictate. Alternatively, the idea of giving tax breaks to pollutors who regulate themselves would only be sponsoring a
21
costly and inefficient means of control.
Added to these economic problems would be the diplomatic difficulties encountered in collecting taxes. In tight
international markets few nations would allow a tax penalty
on their production costs which the goods of other nations
do not bear. The Genossenschaften idea is still not a totally
effective pollution plan. An example of the missing features
is found in a study of the Mekong River experience.
1")Wheeler, International Multipurpose Water Resources Development in
the Lower Mekong Basin, 45 WASH. U. L. REv. 42 (1970).
2
o KNESSE & BOWER at 173.
21 Id. at 178.
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Started twelve years ago, the Mekong Committee regulates six cooperating riparians on the Mekong River. Despite
diverse political and cultural backgrounds of the member
nations this joint commission has gradually assumed more
powers. 22 The duties of the agency now include the coordination of research, the recruiting of financial and technical aid,
the establishment of water use criteria and the supervision
of construction projects. The trend is directly opposite from
the normal international river agency development which
normally finds authority gravitating back to the national
23
level.
The key to the success on the Mekong was undoubtedly
due to the lack of pre-existing development on the river at
the time the commission was formed.2 4 Coupled with full
support from the United Nations and funding from a variety
of international organizations, the Mekong River Commission
really encountered no opposition. 25 The economic advantages
of cooperation far outweighed any political differences and
overcame any opposition from established economic circles. 20
Countries must be convinced that pollution control is for
their own benefit. The advantages attaching to pollution control must not be merely indirect or aesthetic. Further, the
entire process must be sheltered from international political
instability. In short, the advantages to a country participating
in pollution control must be in dollars and cents. The controls
must also operate somewhat spontaneously, with as little
governmental involvement as possible. Current methods for
river management and pollution control simply do not have
this flexibility. Keeping the limitation of present schemes in
mind, the following is a proposed plan for international river
management, emphasizing pollution control. It is to be administered by a commission, here unnamed.
STAGE I

Section A: Purpose
1. This commission is established to protect the public
health and welfare, enhance the quality of the water and serve
the purposes of this Act; taking into consideration things connected in any reasonable way with use and value of water for
22Shapiro-Libai at 205-08.
23

Kenworthy at 598.
Shapiro-Libai at 210.
25 Id. at 205, 209.
26 Id. at 212.
24
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public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes and agricultural, industrial and other legitimate

uses. (a)**
Section B:

Membership, purpose, staff and funding
1. The commission shall be made up of one director from
each of the member nations and shall have tenure for life. They
shall be chosen for their ability to carry out this Act. Their
actions shall be motivated by the guiding principle that their
highest call is the improvement and management of the water
resources of the entire area and shall not be advocates for any
one respective region at the expense of the overall purpose.
2. Members of the commission have power to hire staff,
acquire or build facilities, or to do whatever else they deem
necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
3. This commission shall be funded initially by one-half
of one percent of the gross national product of each member
state and thereafter by user fees as provided for in STAGE IV. (b)
Comments
(a) The goals and powers of this plan are set forth in very
broad language. This, hopefully, will allow the commission to
adjust the framework of the act to any unforeseen situation
that may arise in carrying out the purpose of this act. Knesse
states that the broadness and generality of the Genossenschaften
(regional water management commission for the Ruhr River
Basin), is one of the contributing factors to its success. "This
has left the staff and the members comparatively free to adapt
to changing conditions and to develop procedures and concepts
in line with experience." 27
(b) The presently implemented plan on the Rhine River
utilizes one percent of the gross national product of all bordering states for pollution control.
STAGE II

Section A: Water resource and pollution abatement study
1. The commission will make a study of the resources of
the area projected water uses, and water classification proposals,
taking into consideration:
a. type and amount of demand for water use; (a)
b. stream flow conditions, utilization and the quality
standards to be observed. (b) & (c)
27 A. KNESSE, ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL MANAGEMENT

162 [hereinafter cited as KNESSE].
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2. The commission will then proceed to formulate an abatement scheme by determining the most economic abatement
processes (d), taking into consideration:
a. recreational and aesthetic values;
b. construction of treatment plants;
c. in-plant treatment plans; (e)
d. amortization schedule. (f)
3. After all of the above, costs for financing implementation
shall be apportioned to each polluter. (g)
4. A reasonable estimation of benefits and allocation of
costs shall be made. (h)
Comments
(a) The principle that quality standards should be fixed
in terms of utilization will be followed, always keeping in mind
environmental values. Litwin addresses himself to the great
multiplicity of needs that accompany realistic water use for
water courses.
High quality water is required for drinking, unpolluted water
for swimming, non-poisonous water with an acceptable mineral content for agriculture, and water for industry which
must often fulfill technical requirements. In our modern community and industrial life, the waters of any country must
serve as a source of protein food, transportation for commerce,
aquatic recreation, sources of vital domestic water supplies,
irrigation for crnps, water for agriculture and animals, power
for industry, a necessary raw material for industry and as a
means of transporting from 28municipalities and industries their
wastes and liquid products.

(b) Water resources will be administered according to
international drainage basins. An international drainage basin
is defined for the purposes of this act as waters bound by watershed extremities of the systems of waters, including surface,
subsurface and underground waters, all of which flow toward
a common terminus.
(c) If at all practical, water courses will be classified according to their utilization and the quality standards to be
observed. Litwin states that
Classification . . . offers serious advantages.

It

enables the

composition of the waters in their present state and their possible uses to be known, the cause of pollution to be discovered,
to be prepared and their order of
and protective measures
29
application determined.
28 J. LITWIN, CONTROL OF RIVER POLLUTION
LiTWIN].
29 LrrwIN at

30.

12 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
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The commission will be better able to understand the relationships between the standards of quality of the receiving media
and the characteristics of the effluents. Through this system of
classification, the commission will be able to make discharges
from their sewage treatment plants more suitable to the characteristics of the receiving medium.
Water classification will have a practical relationship to
the use made for the water and the economics that will be
derived from upgrading or stabilization of water quality.
(d) All other economic considerations will be considered
when developing a water treatment plan. The Genossenschaften
viewed waste disposal supply problems as one system character,
rather than solely as a matter of individual treatment. The commission in planning treatment facilities will also look at the
problem in these terms. Scale of economics will be considered,
perhaps linking towns or domestic or industrial users, or even
entire watersheds as the Genossenschaften has done on the
Emscher. Variables such as alternative sites, scales of devlopment at each site, combinations of alternative sites and scales,
etc., will also be taken into consideration."
(e)
This provision for determining the most suitable abatement scheme will have to be read in conjunction with STAGE III,
Section A2, providing for the opportunity of industry already
established at the time of implementation, to choose between
in-plant or out-plant sewage treatment, and STAGE V, Section A2,
which requires industry to abide by licensing requirements.
(f) A situation such as an odorous discharge near a water
supply intake or heavily populated area (or a situation where the
cost of regulating pollution from an industry is so costly that the
commission deems it in the best interests of the plan to allow the
polluting activity).
(g) The commission will apportion the costs of individual
pollution by utilizing the method developed by the Genossenschaften for determining aggregate dilution requirements.
Knesse stated that
(1) There is estimated first an amount of water necessary
to dilute a given amount of materials subject to sedimentation (no distinction made between organic and inorganic
material) in order that they might not be destructive to
fish life under conditions of the area. An amount of dilution water required by such material in a given effluent
is then computed on that basis.
30 Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the

Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 940-45 (1965)
(remarks of A. Knesse, Director of Water Resource Program, Resources
for the Future, Inc.).
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(2)

(3)

(4)

An analogous calculation is made for materials subject to
biochemical degration (and which, therefore exert oxygen demand) but which are not subject to sedimentation.
The amount of dilution required under specific conditions
in order that toxical material in the effluent not kill fish
is computed by direct experimentation.
Certain side calculations having to do with water depletion, heat in effluent, etc., are made. The derived dilution
requirements are added together for the effluent and
form a basis for comparison with all other effluents. In
principle, costs are distributed in accordance with the
proportion of aggregate dilution requirements accounted
for by the specific effluent. 31

Preservation of fish life might be only one consideration
the commission will use to determine the water quality of a
given stretch of the streams. The Genossenschaften index will
be used to determine the proportionate share a particular polluter will be required to pay out of the total cost of pollution
abatement for the entire river basin.
This method of first determining an overall cost plan and
then allocating cost incurred by individual polluters, allows the
commission to retain a certain flexibility. If the commission
finds that because of increased quantity of pollution, a larger
scale of operation is required, costs are simply assessed on the
proportionate share method. If the quality or quantity of individual pollutants increases, the commission simply recomputes tle polluter's proportionate share and readjusts assessed
costs.

Clarence Tarzwell commented on the type of effluent
standard suggested by the Federal conference. The scheme was
based on a standard effluent concentration for all polluters
based on a given quality desired for the stream. An interesting
consequence was that pollution could be increased simply by
increasing the quantity of water used by polluters so that the
amount of material disposed of could be increased but effluent
content would be maintained; also a longer period for the
plant's operation (a night shift, for instance) which would
again allow more polluting with the same a standard concentration. 32 The above problem would not arise under our plan. The
cost to an individual polluter would be determined on the basis
of actual polluting material produced rather than merely requiring that a polluter maintain a certain effluent standard
that can easily be circumvented.
31

32

Id.
C. Tarzwell, Water Quality Requirements for Aquatic Life, in NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON QUALITY STANDARDS FOR NATURAL WATERS 190-92 (U.
Mich. School of Pub. Health 1966).
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Another problem Tarzwell mentioned would be in setting
standards which, taken together, will produce precisely the
desired water quality. This would seem to leave no room for
entry of new industries, or expansion by existing ones. If the
commission were to readjust standards for effluents in a situation like this, instead of the difference being readjusted
through a price mechanism each polluter would have to re33
adjust his particular pollution control operation.
(h)
This particular provision is very crucial to the effectiveness of the plan. Any viable plan for an international
waterway must not only be viable from an economic standpoint, but must also be politically expedient. In the absence
of a complete centralization of decision making, inducements
through economic and political incentives are necessary. The
first hurdle that must be overcome in managing water quality
of an international river is to make it desirable for every country involved to be a party to the plan.
This desirability factor will be maximized by balancing the
costs and benefits of the plan in the following manner:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Payments to the previously established polluters will be
made by the amount of their required proportionate share
of the total pollution abatement scheme.
Additional costs of pollution from new or expanding
polluting activities after the year the plan is implemented
will have to be assumed by the party adding the pollutants. The additional costs will be apportioned by the continually re-evaluated Genossenschaften index. (This plan
will not be a license to pollute and this comment should
assure downstream users that they will no longer have to
assume the cost of others' pollution). The initial costs of
abatement will be divided disproportionately for a numof reasons: a. because they have traditionally carried the
cost under previously existing conditions; and b. because
the political consequences of requiring existing polluters
in upper riparian countries might be too much of a liability, while industrial or municipal polluters not yet in
existence cannot as successfully assert opposition to the
act.
Costs to the water users will be computed by the total
amount of the abatement scheme reduced by one-half
percent of the gross national product of all countries party
to the plan divided by the amount of water used by the
34
party.
Some of the benefits to downstream users will be the advantages of their water supply being improved in the

33 Id. See also KNESSE, ch. 7.

34 This figure is subject to revision and will be computed by its relationships with benefits to the public from recreational advantages of improved quality, the aesthetic values enjoyed by the public, and other
benefits enjoyed by the public that cannot accurately be quantified.
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Another benefit is that over the long term, water use
cost will decrease after the year of implementation. The
Act will achieve this result by fixing the total cost of the
abatement scheme at the time the plan is implemented.
Thus, with increasing as well as expanded use, the average cost of a unit of water will decrease. For instance; if
the total cost of the plan the year it is implemented is X,
and if there is only one user Y, the cost of the water for
Y will be:
X- % of gross national product
Y
The next year, if his neighbor Z uses a unit of water, the
cost to Y will only be:
X- % of gross national product
Y plus Z

STAGE III
Section A: Feedback
1. The commission will inform polluters of the amount
and type of their pollutants; the treatment proposed by the
commission and the payments that will be made.
2. Within sixty days, the commission will receive from the
polluters their plans either to comply with the treatment plans
of the commission, or to seek an alternative course. (a)
3. The commission will notify users of their plans to tax
users.
4. Information shall be made available to the public of any
and all plans specifying standards to which polluters will be
held, proposed treatment, payments to polluters, tax placed on
users, proposed construction of any and all treatment plants
and any other communication deemed by the public to be of
interest. (b)
Section B: Plans adjustment
After the above mentioned provision is provided for, plans
will be adjusted accordingly; and any or all provisions of this
stage shall be repeated if plans are changed substantially.
Comments
(a) It is not intended that the commission will make
extensive studies of industrial processing to the point that they
unnecessarily intrude into the ongoing management of the industries. This would be politically unsound. The commission
will determine the pollution payment without an intensive
study into the internal processing of the industry. If the industry is able to abate the pollution more efficiently, they
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should be so encouraged. They will, of course, be held to the
maximum standard of abatement and be paid the maximum
payment by the commission.
Joseph Sax states that industries are very reluctant to have
the government control in-plant operations, even though process
or product changes are often the more efficient. It is probably
politically not feasible and practically unworkable to expect the
commission to be able to determine the most economical treatment of pollutants in this respect. Also, plant operators know
their operation best and are best situated to determine what,
if any, process adjustments or product change are most efficient. The most the commission can reasonably be expected
to do is to plan for the most efficient treatment of pollutants
through waste recovery and through process alterations gen35
erally recognized as feasible in the industry.
The commission might want to limit excess payments from
more efficient abatement techniques developed by industry,
to research costs and reasonable profits. The commission could
alter the payments made to polluters after research costs and
reasonable profits accrued. This comment will only apply to
industries established before the date of the implementation
of the act. All industries after that time will have to comply
with any design requirements that the commission deems necessary in order to secure a license to operate as provided in
STAGE V, Section A2.
The interested party provision is necessary in the interests
of fairness, as well as to facilitate the formulation of the best
possible plan. Also, if parties are not guaranteed the opportunity to assert their right to be heard through the system, it
is possible they may attack and possibily disrupt the process
by means of noncooperation, active opposition, or private
litigation.
The interested party provision also serves another function.
Josef Litwin mentioned that one of the drawbacks of a broadly
outlined plan such as ours is that administrative regulations
and enforcement are never effectively implmented. STAGE III,
Section A4 will put the burden on public interests groups to
police the commission's activities, making sure that the policy
of the act is being adhered to.
Donald Carmichael discusses how to effectuate the mechanism for interested party input. Public hearings should be required prior to the issuance of final orders and prior to the
35 J. SAX,

WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY

417 (1968).
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approval of final plans on building and implementation. Publication of notice and mailing of notice to all parties proposed
to be regulated or known to be interested should be required. 36.
Following the initial public hearings, copies of the order
or decision issued should be served by mail on all parties regulated and on all parties who have entered an appearance at the
hearing. The number of parties wishing to preserve their status
as interested parties throughout the enforcement and regulatory procedure, could then realistically be limited by requiring
that such parties perform further affirmative actions, such as
completing, having notarized and returning within a limited
time an affidavit on which they would identify themselves
and the nature of their interest as to one or more of the regulation charges or regulated polluters. A small fee might be
charged by the department for registration by such interested
parties. They should, thereafter, be notified of final orders
and final approval of plans and further steps in the regulatory
process, such as plan submission of new or expanding municipal
works or industries, and approvals and petition for order
modifications. Public hearings concerning such regulatory steps
could be provided upon request of a given number or percentage of interested parties and objections noted in the official
record when there was no public hearing. Rules would further
have to be provided for excusably tardy intervention by
properly interested parties. All hearings and communications
by the commission should be of public record.
Finally, commission orders and decisions would be reviewable by the courts if jurisdiction could be asserted under the
law of the national's own country. All ordinary civil law
remedies will be available. While there would ordinarily be
substantial evidence to support the agency's decision, what the
reviewing court would really be asked to decide is, whether
the commission has made best possible decision in view of the
treatment alternatives available, their costs and efficiencies;
whether the purpose of the act is not being fulfilled by the
actions of the commission and any other grievance which could
reasonably be argued to violate the principle of fairness and

equity.

36 Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin; A

Case Study, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 350.
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STAGE IV

Section A: Completion of plans, collection of user fees,
enforcement
1. Plans shall be completed and construction will begin
with all due haste. Also, industrial redesign and product
changes shall be made with all due haste. The commission shall
have the power to set a time limit for implementation and to
penalize for non-compliance.
2. All regulations and orders will be enforced at the earliest time the commission deems feasible.
3. User fees shall be collected and pollution payments
made.
4. It shall be made a criminal as well as a civil offense to
violate any regulation of the commission.
STAGE V

Section A: Persons dumping after passage of this act
1. After final passage of the act, any person who dumps
directly or indirectly any substance into the waters of the river
basin shall notify the commission of such activity. (a) The
commission shall issue such orders and regulations as they
deem necessary to carry out the purpose of this act within
thirty days and agreement to these orders and regulations will
be necessary conditions precedent to starting any polluting
activity. (b)
Should an enterprise break conditions of the license, they
shall:
a. lose all entitlements to compensation as if the concession were withdrawn or closed,
b. possibly be liable in damages,
c. be liable in penalties.
2. The commission will be notified by industries which
are likely to pollute the waters of the river basins of plans as
to location and design of such activity and industries may not
begin construction until the commission has given its approval.
The commission shall have the authority to suggest the most
efficient design of such a polluter and a suitable location, from
the standpoint of the purposes of the act. If these suggestions
are not adhered to the potential polluter will assume the full
weight of the additional burden placed upon the commission.
3. The commission will also receive petitions for modifications of previously authorized operations.

MODEL STATUTE

4. This section will be subject to

STAGE III,

Section B.

5. Violations of this section might also be adjudged a
criminal offense.
Section B: Estimate of land use planning section
The commission will either establish its own land use planning commission, or if there is one already existing, will work
in conjunction with it; but the commission will have final
authority on the use of land directly or indirectly affecting
the hydrologic unit. (c)
Section C: Ongoing function of the commission
The commission will continue to carry on a study of pollution treatment and effects and will utilize any work done
in this area; such findings will be continually utilized in a
constant re-evaluation of plans and regulations in a continuing
effort to carry out the purpose of this act. (d)
Comments
(a) These provisions should apply not only to overflow,
outflow, discharge, and direct or indirect dumping of substances, but more generally, to any activity liable to cause or
increase pollution by altering the physical, chemical, biological,
37
or bacteriological characteristic of the water.
This subsection is meant to include additional polluting
after the passage of this act.
(b) Through ongoing experimentation and research, the
commission will become expert in industrial design as it affects
pollution. If new industry does not follow the suggestions of
the commission it will be charged for any additional inefficiencies. Location of a polluting activity is another element to
be considered in the overall abatement plan. The location
should take into consideration accessibility to existing treatment facilities, possible scales of economy, ability of the stream
to assimilate waste, etc.38 Again, additional costs to the plan
because of an unfavorable location will be an additional factor
in assessing the costs of polluting to the new industry or
municipal developer.
(c) A coordinated effort between land users and the water
pollution commission is necessary in cases where the use has
a direct affect on water pollution, as in irrigation, releases of
reservoirs, land development and mining.3 9
37 LrrwIN at 25.
38 KNESSE at 187.

39 Id. at 202.
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(d) The need for re-evaluation as well as the necessity
for immediate action is apparent:
Since new products and new waste are constantly appearing,
this work will never be completed, but must go on, we believe, as long as this nation exists.
We can not wait until we have all the answers before we
suggest water quality requirements for desired water uses,
for there would then be little left to protect. It is imperative
that we use the knowledge we now have, drawing upon our
experiences and judgment to develop uniform water quality
standards. If we will do this, we will make a very good beginning and will go a long way toward preserving our aquatic
40
resources ....

40

Tarzwell, supra note 32, at 90.

